Your RIGHT to travel
“The right to travel is part of the liberty of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the 5th Amendment. This Right was emerging as early as the Magna Carta.” (1215 c.e.) Kent v Dules 357 US 116 (1958)
“Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a gzeroblessing that we have forgotten the days of the "Robber Barons" and toll roads,...” Robertson v. Department of Public Works, 180 Wn. 133
"The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived." Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 221.
"The right of a citizen to use the highways, including the streets of the city or town, for travel and to transport his goods, is an inherent right which cannot be taken from him." Florida Motor Lines v. Ward, 137 So. 163, 167; State v. Quigg, (Fla. - 1927), 114 So. 859, 862;
"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.” American Jurisprudence 1st Edition, Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135.
“The Supreme Court has recognized that personal liberty includes 'the right of locomotion, the right to move from one place to another according to inclination.'" Davis v. City of Houston, (Tex. Civ. App., 1924), 264 S.W. 625, 629.
"The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common law right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579.
"No one may be required to obtain a license in order to speak. Thus, the State can no more license the Appellant's right to travel in his automobile than it could license his right to print or to speak, for they are all inalienable rights." Thomas v. Collins, (1944), 323 U.S. 516, 543,
"The right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege, it is a right or liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.“ Adams v City of Pocatello, 416 P.2d 46, 48.
"At Common Law there is no precise limit of speed. A traveler by automobile must adopt a reasonable speed." Gallagher v. Montplier, 52 ALR 744; 5 Am Jur. page 645.
“A “US citizen” upon leaving the District of Columbia becomes involved in “interstate commerce”, as a “resident” does not have the common-law right to travel, of a Citizen of one of the several States.” Hendrick v. Maryland S.C. Reporter’s Rd. 610-625. (1914)
"A license is a privilege granted by the state" and "cannot possibly exist with reference to something which is a right...to ride and drive over the streets". "If we allow the City of Chicago to require the licensing of horseless carriages, how long be the City of Chicago would want to require license to ride a horse or to walk upon the streets?“ City of Chicago v Cullens, et al, 51 N.E. 907, 910, etc. (1906)
“The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State…” Article IV of the Articles of Confederation
“(47) "Person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, joint venture or legal entity of whatever nature.” Delaware Code Title 21 § 101
“(16) "Person" and "whoever" respectively include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies and joint-stock companies, as well as individuals.” Delaware Code Title 1 § 302
“(42) "Operator" includes every person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway,” Delaware Code Title 21 § 101
“(26) "License" means any license, temporary instruction permit or temporary license issued under the laws of this State pertaining to the licensing of persons to operate motor vehicles.” Delaware Code Title 21 § 101
“(a) No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a public street or highway of this State without first having been licensed under this chapter…”
Delaware Code Title 21 § 2701. Driving without a license; penalties
"Person" means an individual, firm, partnership, association, or corporation.” Texas Transportation Code Section 541.001 (4)
“"Person" includes corporation, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, and any other legal entity.” Texas Government Code 311.005 (2)
“"Operator" means, as used in reference to a vehicle, a person who drives or has physical control of a vehicle.” Texas Transportation Code Section 541.001 (1)
“"Police officer" means an officer authorized to direct traffic or arrest persons who violate traffic regulations.” Texas Transportation Code Section 541.002 (4)
Texas Trans. Code § 201.904. Speed Signs. The department shall erect & maintain on the highways & roads of this state appropriate signs that show the maximum lawful speed for commercial motor vehicles, truck tractors, truck trailers, truck semi-trailers & motor vehicles engaged in the business of transporting passengers for compensation or hire (buses).
Texas Trans. Code § 545.351. Maximum Speed Requirement. (a) An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable & prudent under the circumstances then existing. (b) An operator: (1) may not drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable & prudent under the conditions & having regard for actual & potential hazards then existing; & (2) shall control the speed of the vehicle as necessary to avoid colliding with another person or vehicle …
Texas Trans. Code § 521.001. Definitions. (a) In this chapter: (3) “Driver's license” means an authorization issued by the Dept. for the operation of a motor vehicle. The term includes: (A) a temporary license or instruction permit; & (B) occupational license.
“Person.- "Person" includes: (1) An individual, receiver, trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, fiduciary, or representative of any kind and any partnership, firm, association, public or private corporation, or other entity” Maryland Transportation Code § 1-101 (j)
“"Driver" means any individual who drives a vehicle.” Maryland Transportation Code 11-115
“In every enactment….For greater certainty, “Canada” includes the internal waters of Canada and the territorial sea of Canada;” Section 35(1) Canada Interpretation Act
"In every enactment….person , or any word or expression descriptive of a person, includes a corporation” Section 35(1) Canada Interpretation Act
“In Every Act and Regulation; “person” includes a corporation” Section 87 Legislation Act of Ontario
“In this Act; “driver” means a person who drives a vehicle on a highway” Section 1(1) Highway Traffic Act of Ontario
"The term "Motor Vehicle" means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.
The term "used for commercial purposes" means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.“ 18 USC § 31
“The statute creates a rebuttable presumption of residency for anyone who meets the following criteria: …. however no such person shall be considered a resident for purposes of this chapter unless such person is either a United States citizen or an alien with legal authorization from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.“ Jennifer Ammons, General Counsel, Georgia Department of Driver Services
“person” includes a corporation and the heirs, executors, administrators or other legal representatives of a person;” Section 28(1)(nn) Alberta Interpretation Act
““driver” means a person who is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle…”
Section 1(1)(k) Traffic Safety Act of Alberta
“In an Enactment “person” includes a corporation and the heirs, executors, administrators or other legal representatives of a person; («personne»)” Section 27 (1) Saskatchewan Interpretation Act
“Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the regulations, a person or that person’s agent may apply for:
(a) a driver’s licence; or
(b) a duplicate driver’s licence to replace a driver’s licence that has been lost or destroyed.”
Section 40(1) Saskatchewan Traffic Safety Act
A Legislator contacted me about writing a Bill for Right to Travel asking for ideas on what to include
He told me that any Bill had to go through their legal department
“When the Parliament uses general terms like “all persons,” or “all residents” they are only talking about “persons,” or “residents” who are properly within their jurisdiction.” Worthington v Manitoba (1936) S.C.R. 48
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Does a Statute apply to Private Travel
“Parliament can only implicate a Sovereign citizen by “express mention or clear implication.” CBC v Ontario (1959) S.C.R. 204
Case below:
The point to be determined is as to the meaning to be assigned to the language of subs. (15) of s.2 of the Criminal Code, insofar as it relates to Her Majesty. It reads that “person” includes Her Majesty. Does this mean that the Sovereign may be charged with any of the multitude of offenses described in the Criminal Code which she, as an individual, is capable of committing and summoned to appear before a tribunal charged with the duty of determining the guilt or innocence of persons infringing the criminal laws and, if guilty, imposing punishment?
The definition of “person” in its present form, as has been stated, appeared when the Criminal Code was first enacted in 1892. At that time and at present the state of the law in relation to the liability of the Sovereign to criminal proceedings appears to me to be accurately stated in Halsbury, 3rd ed., vol. 7, p. 223, in the following terms:
The person of the Sovereign is inviolable, since it is declared by statute to be the undoubted and fundamental law of the kingdom that neither the peers of this realm nor the Commons, nor both together, either in Parliament or out of Parliament, nor the people collectively or representative, nor any other persons whatsoever, ever had, have, or ought to have any coercive power over the persons of the Kings of this realm.
So also the person of the Sovereign is immune from all suits and actions at law, either civil or criminal.
There is no power or authority within her dominions capable of binding the Sovereign, save only the Sovereign herself in Parliament, and then only by express mention or clear implication.
I do not think that it is any longer right to say that the Queen can do no wrong, though in earlier times the immunity was so stated: Holdsworth’s History of English Law, vol. 3, p. 458.
The true ground appears to me to be correctly stated in the following passage from Russell on Crime, 11th ed., p. 103:
Notwithstanding the words of Hale “the law presumes, the king will do no wrong, neither indeed can do any wrong”; and of Blackstone, who carried this further by stating that the law “ascribes to the king, in his political capacity, absolute perfection” and that he “is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong,” the doctrine of regal immunity really rests upon the fact that no British tribunal has jurisdiction under which the sovereign can be tried.
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“A Sovereign is not a person as far as a Statute is concerned.” Will v Michigan State Police 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989)
A “person” is; “a variety of entities other than human beings.” Church of Scientology v U.S. Department of Justice, 612 F2d 417 (1979) at pg 418 “...foreigners, not citizens....” United States v Otherson, 480 F. Supp. 1369 (1979) at pg 1373.
A Sovereign is not a person as far as a Statute is concerned. " 'in common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the [word] are normally construed to exclude it.' Wilson v Omaha Tribe, 442 US 653 667, 61 L Ed 2d 153, 99 S Ct 2529 (1979) (quoting United States v Cooper Corp. 312 US 600, 604, 85 L Ed 1071, 61 S Ct 742 (1941). See also United States v Mine Workers, 330 US 258, 275, 91 L Ed 884, 67 S Ct 677 (1947)" Will v Michigan State Police, 491 US 58, 105 L. Ed. 2d
“Residents, as distinguished from citizens, are aliens who are permitted to take up a permanent abode in the country. Being bound to the society by reason of their dwelling in it, they are subject to its laws so long as they remain there, and, being protected by it, they must defend it, although they do not enjoy all the rights of citizens. They have only certain privileges which the law, or custom, gives them. Permanent residents are those who have been given the right of perpetual residence. They are a sort of citizen of a less privileged character, and are subject to the society without enjoying all its advantages. Their children succeed to their status; for the right of perpetual residence given them by the State passes to their children.” The Law of Nations, Vattel, Book 1, Chapter 19, Section 213, p. 87
“One does not necessarily become a nonresident by absconding or absenting himself from his place of abode.” 52 Mo. App. 291
“DRIVER. One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals.” Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 1856 Edition, page 447 [emphasis added]
“DRIVER. One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1st Edition, page 395 [emphasis added]
“DRIVER. One employed in conducting a coach, carriage. wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, tricycle, or motor other motor car, though not a street, railroad car. See Davis v. Petrinovich, 112 Ala. 654, 21 South 344. 36 L. R. A. 615, Gen. St. Conn. 1902, § 2038; Isaacs v. Railroad Co., 47 N. Y. 122. 7 Am. Rep. 418.” Black’s Law Dictionary 2nd Edition, page 398 [emphasis added]
“DRIVER. One employed in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car. A person actually doing driving, whether employed by owner to drive or driving his own vehicle. Wallace v. Woods, 340 Mo. 452, 102 S.W.2d 91, 97.” Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Edition, page 585 [emphasis added],
“OPERATE. This word, when used with relation to automobiles, signifies a personal act in working the mechanism of the automobile; that is, the driver operates the automobile for the owner, but the owner does not operate the automobile unless he drives it himself. Beard v. Clark, Tex.Civ. App., 83 S.W.2d 1023, 1025....” Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Edition page 1243 [emphasis added]
"It will be observed from the language of the ordinance that a distinction is to be drawn between the terms 'operator' and 'driver'; the 'operator' of the service car being the person who is licensed to have the car on the streets in the business of carrying passengers for hire; while the 'driver' is the one who actually drives the car. However, in the actual prosecution of business, it was possible for the same person to be both 'operator' and 'driver.'" Newbill vs. Union Indemnity Co., 60 SE.2d 658, [emphasis added],
"The Supreme Court, in Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed. 825, held that carriages were properly classified as household effects, and we see no reason that automobiles should not be similarly disposed of." Hillhouse v United States, 152 F. 163, 164
“Automobile purchased for the purpose of transporting buyer to and from his place of employment was ``consumer goods'' as defined in UCC §9-109.” Mallicoat v Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 3 UCC Rep Serv 1035; 415 S.W.2d 347
“Under UCC §9-109 there is a real distinction between goods purchased for personal use and those purchased for business use. The two are mutually exclusive and the principal use to which the property is put should be considered as determinative.” James Talcott, Inc. v Gee, 5 UCC Rep Serv 1028; 266 Cal.App.2d 384, 72 Cal.Rptr. 168 (1968).
“The classification of goods in UCC §9-109 are mutually exclusive.” McFadden v Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 8 UCC Rep Serv 766; 260 Md 601, 273 A.2d 198 (1971).
“Automobile purchased for the purpose of transporting buyer to and from his place of employment was ``consumer goods'' as defined in UCC §9-109.” Mallicoat v Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 3 UCC Rep Serv 1035; 415 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. App., 1966).
“The provisions of UCC §2-316 of the Maryland UCC do not apply to sales of consumer goods (a term which includes automobiles, whether new or used, that are bought primarily for personal, family, or household use).” Maryland Independent Automobile Dealers Assoc., Inc. v Administrator, Motor Vehicle Admin., 25 UCC Rep Serv 699; 394 A.2d 820, 41 Md App 7 (1978).
“Under UCC §9-109 there is a real distinction between goods purchased for personal use and those purchased for business use. The two are mutually exclusive and the principal use to which the property is put should be considered as determinative.” James Talcott, Inc. v Gee, 5 UCC Rep Serv 1028; 266 Cal.App.2d 384, 72 Cal.Rptr. 168 (1968).
“The classification of goods in UCC §9-109 are mutually exclusive.” McFadden v Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 8 UCC Rep Serv 766; 260 Md 601, 273 A.2d 198 (1971).
By operation of law, U.C.C. ARTICLE 9 PART 1 § 9109 mirrored by, for example, PA TITLE 13 SUBCHAPTER A § 9102 eliminates any obligation or constraints by commercial regulation. See your State’s UCC for the same.
U.C.C. - ARTICLE 9 (1) “consumer goods”; UCC filings are to give notice on the public side collateral rights-CONSUMER PRODUCT per U.C.C. ARTICLE 9 (1) “consumer goods”; CONSUMER GOODS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE REGISTERED
§ 9102. Definitions: "Consumer goods." Goods which are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
"All household goods owned by the user thereof and used solely for noncommercial purposes shall be exempt from taxation, and such person to such exemption shall not be required to take any affirmative action to receive the benefit from such exemption." Ariz. Const. Art. 9,2
“Whenever [the Uniform Commercial Code] creates a "presumption" with respect to a fact, or provides that a fact is "presumed," the trier of fact must find the existence of the fact unless and until evidence is introduced that supports a finding of its nonexistence.” UCC § 1206 Presumptions [emphasis added]
“(a) In an action with respect to an instrument, the authenticity of, and authority to make, each signature on the instrument are admitted unless specifically denied in the pleadings. If the validity of a signature is denied in the pleadings, the burden of establishing validity is on the person claiming validity, but the signature is presumed to be authentic and authorized unless the action is to enforce the liability of the purported signer and the signer is dead or incompetent at the time of trial of the issue of validity of the signature.” Uniform Commercial Code § 3.308 Proof of Signatures and Status as Holder in Due Course [emphasis added]
“The following rules apply in an action on a certificated security against the issuer:
(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each signature on a security certificate or in a necessary indorsement is admitted.
(2) If the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue, the burden of establishing effectiveness is on the party claiming under the signature, but the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized.” Uniform Commercial Code § 8.114 Evidentiary Rules Concerning Certificated Securities [emphasis added]
They presume that because a vehicle has a State Plate on it, then you are one of the slaves
"(h) DEFINITION’s. …. "(3) MOTOR VEHICLE.-The term 'motor vehicle' means a self-propelled vehicle which is registered for highway use under the laws of any State or foreign country. "(4) SECURITY.-The term 'security' means any bond, debenture, note, or certificate or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by a corporation or a government or political subdivision thereof, with interest coupons or in registered form, share of stock, voting trust certificate, or any certificate of interest or participation in, certificate of deposit or receipt for, temporary or interim certificate for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing: negotiable instrument: or money.” Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 at Public Law 89-719 at 80 Stat. 1130-1131
"We therefore decline to overrule the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall: We hold that the District of Columbia is not a state within Article 3 of the Constitution. In other words cases between citizens of the District and those of the states were not included of the catalogue of controversies over which the Congress could give jurisdiction to the federal courts by virtue of Article 3. In other words Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction over citizens of Washington District of Columbia and through their plenary power nationally covers those citizens even when in one of the several states as though the district expands for the purpose of regulating its citizens wherever they go throughout the states in union" National Mutual Insurance Company of the District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Company, 337 U.S. 582, 93 L.Ed. 1556 (1948)
“INTERNATIONAL LAW RULE: Adopted for areas under Federal legislative jurisdiction” “Federalizes State civil law, including common law.--The rule serves to federalize not only the statutory but the common law of a State. STATE AND FEDERAL VENUE DISCUSSED: The civil laws effective in an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction are Federal law, notwithstanding their derivation from State laws, and a cause arising under such laws may be brought in or removed to a Federal district court under sections 24 or 28 of the former Judicial Code (now sections 1331 and 1441 of title 28, United States Code), giving jurisdiction to such courts of civil actions arising under the "* * *laws * * * of the United States"…” Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States – Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States, Part II, A Text of the Law of Legislative Jurisdiction Submitted to the Attorney General and Transmitted to the President June 1957, page 158-165
"But individuals, when acting as representatives of a collective group, cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights and duties, nor be entitled to their purely personal privileges. Rather they assume the rights, duties and privileges of the artificial entity or association of which they are agents or officers and they are bound by its obligations." Brasswell v. United States 487 U.S. 99 (1988) quoting, United States v. White 322 U.S. 694 (1944),
They forge your signature onto a contract and then presume it is valid and if you do not object…. They sell you into slavery
". . . (E)very taxpayer is a cestui qui trust having sufficient interest in the preventing abuse of the trust to be recognized in the field of this court's prerogative jurisdiction . .” In Re Bolens (1912), 135 N.W. 164.
“A “citizen of the United States” is a civilly dead entity operating as a co-trustee and co-beneficiary of the PCT (Public Charitable Trust), the constructive, cestui que trust of US Inc. under the 14th Amendment, which upholds the debt of the USA and US Inc.” Congressional Record, June 13 1967, pp. 15641-15646
“Yet still it was found difficult to set bounds to ecclesiastical ingenuity; for when they were driven out of all their former holds, they devised a new method of conveyance, by which the lands were granted, not to themselves directly, but to nominal feoffees to the use of the religious houses; thus distinguishing between the possession and the use, and receiving the actual profits, while the seisin of the lands remained in the nominal feoffee, who was held by the courts of equity (then under the direction of the clergy) to be bound in conscience to account to his cestui que use for the rents and emoluments of the estate: and it is to these inventions that our practitioners are indebted for the introduction of uses and trusts, the foundation of modern conveyancing.” Tomlins Law Dictionary 1835 edition, Volume 2 under the definition of Mortmain
“…the reason for the initial detention, speeding & running a red light are not a breach of the peace.” Perkins v Texas, 812 S.W. 2d 326
If there is no breach of the peace, and you are not carrying passengers or property for hire, then it is an unlawful arrest
“Any restraint, however slight, upon another’s liberty to come and go as one pleases, constitutes an “arrest.” Swetnam v. W.F. Woolworth Co., 318 P.2d 364, 366, 83 Ariz. 189.
“DETENTION. The act of retaining a person or property, and preventing the removal of such person or property.” Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 1856 Edition ,
“An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty has the same right to use force in defending himself as he would in repelling any other assault and battery.” State v. Robinson, 145 ME. 77, 72 ATL. 260.
“One may come to the aid of another being unlawfully arrested, just as he may where one is being assaulted, molested, raped or kidnapped. Thus it is not an offense to liberate one from the unlawful custody of an officer, even though he may have submitted to such custody, without resistance.” Adams v. State, 121 Ga. 16, 48 S.E. 910.
“Similarly, a person cannot be convicted of resisting a peace officer in the execution of his duty unless the officer was acting strictly within the limits of his powers and duty. If the officer makes an unlawful arrest, then there is a common law right to resist that arrest.” Police Manual of Arrest, Seizure and Interrogation, 8th Edition, by The Honorable Roger E. Salhany, page 96
The standard procedure is to drag you into a kangaroo court because it is statutes that they are enforcing "...judges who become involved in enforcement of mere statutes (civil or criminal in nature and otherwise), act as mere "clerks" of the involved agency..." K.C. Davis, ADMIN. LAW, Ch. 1 (CTP. West's 1965 Ed.) [emphasis added]
"A judge ceases to set as a judicial officer because the governing principals of administrative law provides that courts are prohibited from substituting their evidence, testimony, record, arguments and rationale for that of the agency. Additionally, courts are prohibited from their substituting their judgments for that of the agency." AISI v US, 568 F2d 284.
"It is the accepted rule, not only in state courts, but, of the federal courts as well, that when a judge is enforcing administrative law they are described as mere 'extensions of the administrative agency for superior reviewing purposes' as a ministerial clerk for an agency..." 30 Cal 596; 167 Cal 762. [emphasis added]
Judges in these Kangaroo Courts are actually NOT judges but Clerks and they have no immunity whatsoever
“When enforcing mere statutes, judges of all courts do not act judicially” and thus are not protected by “qualified” or “limited immunity,” SEE: Owen v. City, 445 U.S. 662; Bothke v. Terry, 713 F2d 1404
“Judge loses his absolute immunity from damage actions only when he acts in clear absence of all jurisdiction or performance of an act which is not judicial in nature.” Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202
Qualified Immunity “protects governmental officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 2010)(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009) and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
"Qualified immunity defense fails if public officer violates clearly established right because a reasonably competent official should know the law governing his conduct" Jones vs Counce 7-F3d-13598th Cir 1993; Benitez v Wolff 985-F3d 662 2nd Cir 1993
Everything is under a military occupation:
See the Texas and other American States are under a Military Occupation video
See the Alberta and other Canadian States are under a Military Occupation video
I can show that almost every country on the planet is under a military occupation in one way or another
"There are two ways to conquer and enslave a nation. One is by the sword. The other is by debt." John Adams 1826
Serve the Judge, the Prosecutor, and the Chief of Police with a Notice and Demand designed to take away their presumptions
They will probably assign a different Judge
Serve the Chief Judge with a Notice and Demand
If possible get the name of every possible Judge and serve each of them (Registered Mail)
See the D.I.Y. Estoppel Certificates video
Be prepared to file a lawsuit and the issue is citizenship and forgery
They have to established the cestui que trust before they can proceed
"In doing this, I shall have occasion incidentally to evince, how true it is that States and Governments were made for man, and, at the same time, how true it is that his creatures and servants have first deceived, next vilified, and, at last oppressed their master and maker." Chisholm v Georgia, 2 Dal. 419 at p 455 "A state like a merchant makes a contract. A dishonest state, like a dishonest merchant willfully refuses to discharge it." Chisholm v Georgia, 2 Dal. 419 at p 456Your RIGHT to travel
“The right to travel is part of the liberty of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the 5th Amendment. This Right was emerging as early as the Magna Carta.” (1215 c.e.) Kent v Dules 357 US 116 (1958)
“Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a gzeroblessing that we have forgotten the days of the "Robber Barons" and toll roads,...” Robertson v. Department of Public Works, 180 Wn. 133
"The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived." Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 221.
"The right of a citizen to use the highways, including the streets of the city or town, for travel and to transport his goods, is an inherent right which cannot be taken from him." Florida Motor Lines v. Ward, 137 So. 163, 167; State v. Quigg, (Fla. - 1927), 114 So. 859, 862;
"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.” American Jurisprudence 1st Edition, Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135.
“The Supreme Court has recognized that personal liberty includes 'the right of locomotion, the right to move from one place to another according to inclination.'" Davis v. City of Houston, (Tex. Civ. App., 1924), 264 S.W. 625, 629.
"The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common law right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579.
"No one may be required to obtain a license in order to speak. Thus, the State can no more license the Appellant's right to travel in his automobile than it could license his right to print or to speak, for they are all inalienable rights." Thomas v. Collins, (1944), 323 U.S. 516, 543,
"The right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege, it is a right or liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.“ Adams v City of Pocatello, 416 P.2d 46, 48.
"At Common Law there is no precise limit of speed. A traveler by automobile must adopt a reasonable speed." Gallagher v. Montplier, 52 ALR 744; 5 Am Jur. page 645.
“A “US citizen” upon leaving the District of Columbia becomes involved in “interstate commerce”, as a “resident” does not have the common-law right to travel, of a Citizen of one of the several States.” Hendrick v. Maryland S.C. Reporter’s Rd. 610-625. (1914)
"A license is a privilege granted by the state" and "cannot possibly exist with reference to something which is a right...to ride and drive over the streets". "If we allow the City of Chicago to require the licensing of horseless carriages, how long be the City of Chicago would want to require license to ride a horse or to walk upon the streets?“ City of Chicago v Cullens, et al, 51 N.E. 907, 910, etc. (1906)
“The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State…” Article IV of the Articles of Confederation
“(47) "Person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, joint venture or legal entity of whatever nature.” Delaware Code Title 21 § 101
“(16) "Person" and "whoever" respectively include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies and joint-stock companies, as well as individuals.” Delaware Code Title 1 § 302
“(42) "Operator" includes every person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway,” Delaware Code Title 21 § 101
“(26) "License" means any license, temporary instruction permit or temporary license issued under the laws of this State pertaining to the licensing of persons to operate motor vehicles.” Delaware Code Title 21 § 101
“(a) No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a public street or highway of this State without first having been licensed under this chapter…”
Delaware Code Title 21 § 2701. Driving without a license; penalties
"Person" means an individual, firm, partnership, association, or corporation.” Texas Transportation Code Section 541.001 (4)
“"Person" includes corporation, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, and any other legal entity.” Texas Government Code 311.005 (2)
“"Operator" means, as used in reference to a vehicle, a person who drives or has physical control of a vehicle.” Texas Transportation Code Section 541.001 (1)
“"Police officer" means an officer authorized to direct traffic or arrest persons who violate traffic regulations.” Texas Transportation Code Section 541.002 (4)
Texas Trans. Code § 201.904. Speed Signs. The department shall erect & maintain on the highways & roads of this state appropriate signs that show the maximum lawful speed for commercial motor vehicles, truck tractors, truck trailers, truck semi-trailers & motor vehicles engaged in the business of transporting passengers for compensation or hire (buses).
Texas Trans. Code § 545.351. Maximum Speed Requirement. (a) An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable & prudent under the circumstances then existing. (b) An operator: (1) may not drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable & prudent under the conditions & having regard for actual & potential hazards then existing; & (2) shall control the speed of the vehicle as necessary to avoid colliding with another person or vehicle …
Texas Trans. Code § 521.001. Definitions. (a) In this chapter: (3) “Driver's license” means an authorization issued by the Dept. for the operation of a motor vehicle. The term includes: (A) a temporary license or instruction permit; & (B) occupational license.
“Person.- "Person" includes: (1) An individual, receiver, trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, fiduciary, or representative of any kind and any partnership, firm, association, public or private corporation, or other entity” Maryland Transportation Code § 1-101 (j)
“"Driver" means any individual who drives a vehicle.” Maryland Transportation Code 11-115
“In every enactment….For greater certainty, “Canada” includes the internal waters of Canada and the territorial sea of Canada;” Section 35(1) Canada Interpretation Act
"In every enactment….person , or any word or expression descriptive of a person, includes a corporation” Section 35(1) Canada Interpretation Act
“In Every Act and Regulation; “person” includes a corporation” Section 87 Legislation Act of Ontario
“In this Act; “driver” means a person who drives a vehicle on a highway” Section 1(1) Highway Traffic Act of Ontario
"The term "Motor Vehicle" means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.
The term "used for commercial purposes" means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.“ 18 USC § 31
“The statute creates a rebuttable presumption of residency for anyone who meets the following criteria: …. however no such person shall be considered a resident for purposes of this chapter unless such person is either a United States citizen or an alien with legal authorization from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.“ Jennifer Ammons, General Counsel, Georgia Department of Driver Services
“person” includes a corporation and the heirs, executors, administrators or other legal representatives of a person;” Section 28(1)(nn) Alberta Interpretation Act
““driver” means a person who is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle…”
Section 1(1)(k) Traffic Safety Act of Alberta
“In an Enactment “person” includes a corporation and the heirs, executors, administrators or other legal representatives of a person; («personne»)” Section 27 (1) Saskatchewan Interpretation Act
“Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the regulations, a person or that person’s agent may apply for:
(a) a driver’s licence; or
(b) a duplicate driver’s licence to replace a driver’s licence that has been lost or destroyed.”
Section 40(1) Saskatchewan Traffic Safety Act
A Legislator contacted me about writing a Bill for Right to Travel asking for ideas on what to include
He told me that any Bill had to go through their legal department
“When the Parliament uses general terms like “all persons,” or “all residents” they are only talking about “persons,” or “residents” who are properly within their jurisdiction.” Worthington v Manitoba (1936) S.C.R. 48
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Does a Statute apply to Private Travel
“Parliament can only implicate a Sovereign citizen by “express mention or clear implication.” CBC v Ontario (1959) S.C.R. 204
Case below:
The point to be determined is as to the meaning to be assigned to the language of subs. (15) of s.2 of the Criminal Code, insofar as it relates to Her Majesty. It reads that “person” includes Her Majesty. Does this mean that the Sovereign may be charged with any of the multitude of offenses described in the Criminal Code which she, as an individual, is capable of committing and summoned to appear before a tribunal charged with the duty of determining the guilt or innocence of persons infringing the criminal laws and, if guilty, imposing punishment?
The definition of “person” in its present form, as has been stated, appeared when the Criminal Code was first enacted in 1892. At that time and at present the state of the law in relation to the liability of the Sovereign to criminal proceedings appears to me to be accurately stated in Halsbury, 3rd ed., vol. 7, p. 223, in the following terms:
The person of the Sovereign is inviolable, since it is declared by statute to be the undoubted and fundamental law of the kingdom that neither the peers of this realm nor the Commons, nor both together, either in Parliament or out of Parliament, nor the people collectively or representative, nor any other persons whatsoever, ever had, have, or ought to have any coercive power over the persons of the Kings of this realm.
So also the person of the Sovereign is immune from all suits and actions at law, either civil or criminal.
There is no power or authority within her dominions capable of binding the Sovereign, save only the Sovereign herself in Parliament, and then only by express mention or clear implication.
I do not think that it is any longer right to say that the Queen can do no wrong, though in earlier times the immunity was so stated: Holdsworth’s History of English Law, vol. 3, p. 458.
The true ground appears to me to be correctly stated in the following passage from Russell on Crime, 11th ed., p. 103:
Notwithstanding the words of Hale “the law presumes, the king will do no wrong, neither indeed can do any wrong”; and of Blackstone, who carried this further by stating that the law “ascribes to the king, in his political capacity, absolute perfection” and that he “is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong,” the doctrine of regal immunity really rests upon the fact that no British tribunal has jurisdiction under which the sovereign can be tried.
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“A Sovereign is not a person as far as a Statute is concerned.” Will v Michigan State Police 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989)
A “person” is; “a variety of entities other than human beings.” Church of Scientology v U.S. Department of Justice, 612 F2d 417 (1979) at pg 418 “...foreigners, not citizens....” United States v Otherson, 480 F. Supp. 1369 (1979) at pg 1373.
A Sovereign is not a person as far as a Statute is concerned. " 'in common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the [word] are normally construed to exclude it.' Wilson v Omaha Tribe, 442 US 653 667, 61 L Ed 2d 153, 99 S Ct 2529 (1979) (quoting United States v Cooper Corp. 312 US 600, 604, 85 L Ed 1071, 61 S Ct 742 (1941). See also United States v Mine Workers, 330 US 258, 275, 91 L Ed 884, 67 S Ct 677 (1947)" Will v Michigan State Police, 491 US 58, 105 L. Ed. 2d
“Residents, as distinguished from citizens, are aliens who are permitted to take up a permanent abode in the country. Being bound to the society by reason of their dwelling in it, they are subject to its laws so long as they remain there, and, being protected by it, they must defend it, although they do not enjoy all the rights of citizens. They have only certain privileges which the law, or custom, gives them. Permanent residents are those who have been given the right of perpetual residence. They are a sort of citizen of a less privileged character, and are subject to the society without enjoying all its advantages. Their children succeed to their status; for the right of perpetual residence given them by the State passes to their children.” The Law of Nations, Vattel, Book 1, Chapter 19, Section 213, p. 87
“One does not necessarily become a nonresident by absconding or absenting himself from his place of abode.” 52 Mo. App. 291
“DRIVER. One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals.” Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 1856 Edition, page 447 [emphasis added]
“DRIVER. One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1st Edition, page 395 [emphasis added]
“DRIVER. One employed in conducting a coach, carriage. wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, tricycle, or motor other motor car, though not a street, railroad car. See Davis v. Petrinovich, 112 Ala. 654, 21 South 344. 36 L. R. A. 615, Gen. St. Conn. 1902, § 2038; Isaacs v. Railroad Co., 47 N. Y. 122. 7 Am. Rep. 418.” Black’s Law Dictionary 2nd Edition, page 398 [emphasis added]
“DRIVER. One employed in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car. A person actually doing driving, whether employed by owner to drive or driving his own vehicle. Wallace v. Woods, 340 Mo. 452, 102 S.W.2d 91, 97.” Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Edition, page 585 [emphasis added],
“OPERATE. This word, when used with relation to automobiles, signifies a personal act in working the mechanism of the automobile; that is, the driver operates the automobile for the owner, but the owner does not operate the automobile unless he drives it himself. Beard v. Clark, Tex.Civ. App., 83 S.W.2d 1023, 1025....” Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Edition page 1243 [emphasis added]
"It will be observed from the language of the ordinance that a distinction is to be drawn between the terms 'operator' and 'driver'; the 'operator' of the service car being the person who is licensed to have the car on the streets in the business of carrying passengers for hire; while the 'driver' is the one who actually drives the car. However, in the actual prosecution of business, it was possible for the same person to be both 'operator' and 'driver.'" Newbill vs. Union Indemnity Co., 60 SE.2d 658, [emphasis added],
"The Supreme Court, in Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed. 825, held that carriages were properly classified as household effects, and we see no reason that automobiles should not be similarly disposed of." Hillhouse v United States, 152 F. 163, 164
“Automobile purchased for the purpose of transporting buyer to and from his place of employment was ``consumer goods'' as defined in UCC §9-109.” Mallicoat v Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 3 UCC Rep Serv 1035; 415 S.W.2d 347
“Under UCC §9-109 there is a real distinction between goods purchased for personal use and those purchased for business use. The two are mutually exclusive and the principal use to which the property is put should be considered as determinative.” James Talcott, Inc. v Gee, 5 UCC Rep Serv 1028; 266 Cal.App.2d 384, 72 Cal.Rptr. 168 (1968).
“The classification of goods in UCC §9-109 are mutually exclusive.” McFadden v Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 8 UCC Rep Serv 766; 260 Md 601, 273 A.2d 198 (1971).
“Automobile purchased for the purpose of transporting buyer to and from his place of employment was ``consumer goods'' as defined in UCC §9-109.” Mallicoat v Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 3 UCC Rep Serv 1035; 415 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. App., 1966).
“The provisions of UCC §2-316 of the Maryland UCC do not apply to sales of consumer goods (a term which includes automobiles, whether new or used, that are bought primarily for personal, family, or household use).” Maryland Independent Automobile Dealers Assoc., Inc. v Administrator, Motor Vehicle Admin., 25 UCC Rep Serv 699; 394 A.2d 820, 41 Md App 7 (1978).
“Under UCC §9-109 there is a real distinction between goods purchased for personal use and those purchased for business use. The two are mutually exclusive and the principal use to which the property is put should be considered as determinative.” James Talcott, Inc. v Gee, 5 UCC Rep Serv 1028; 266 Cal.App.2d 384, 72 Cal.Rptr. 168 (1968).